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CORRECTION

In April 1973 issue Perspectives, "The Incitement of Palestinian Terrorism," on page 1, paragraph 2, change "Kaleshnikov" to "Kalashnikov."

10 April 1973

NORTH VIETNAMESE CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS

Since October 1972, the North Vietnamese have sent over 300 armored vehicles, mostly medium tanks, into the RVN or contiguous base areas in Cambodia. Approximately half of these are assigned to the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) areas in Cambodia and the northern sector of Military Region 3 (MR-3) in the RVN. At least two armor-associated infiltration groups are believed to have left NVN after 28 January 1973.

A similar situation exists with respect to NVA infiltration of artillery into the South. This is particularly noteworthy since NVA artillery proved to be considerably more destructive and detrimental to ARVN and GVN interests in general than did NVA tanks during the 1972 offensive. The current estimated Communist inventory consists of 260 to as many as 440 field guns in or near the RVN. Of greatest significance is the NVA deployment of some sixty 122-mm and 130-mm field guns to the COSVN bases in Cambodia and RVN MR-3 where Communist forces previously relied solely on shorter range, captured ARVN/FANK 105-mm and 155-mm howitzers for artillery support.

The additional infiltration of about 150 medium caliber anti-aircraft weapons since October 1972, including some mounted on tracked vehicles, will significantly reduce the vulnerability of Communist forces, bases, and lines of communication to RVNAF air strikes. NVA/VC anti-aircraft weapons consisted mainly of heavy machineguns in March 1972.

Psychologically and politically this infiltration of heavy weapons has caused a hardening of the GVN's position on all matters pertaining to the ceasefire. First, GVN attention has been diverted from important political and economic goals to containing this ominous military threat by means of military operations designed to keep Communist forces off balance. While the Communist military buildup may be intended only to preserve an option, the level of the buildup is high enough so that the temptation to exercise this option may become overwhelming in the face of continued frustration with the political struggle.

In addition to furthering ill will between the two opposing South Vietnamese sides at the national and regional levels, local GVN military commanders may be tempted to take pre-emptive action against possible NVA/VC threats. An example can be found in Binh Duong north of Saigon. After the 7th NVA Division suffered heavy casualties in the January 1973 pre-ceasefire offensive in southern

Binh Duong province, the remnants of the division withdrew to the Michelin Plantation in northwest Binh Duong for refitting. Recently, its subordinate regiments were redeployed to central and southern Binh Duong province, reportedly to engage in further offensive activity to gain land and to interdict GVN movements. A dozen ground attacks have been reported since 13 March around Lai Khe and Ben Cat, two major ARVN bases and GVN population centers. As a result, ARVN III Corps Headquarters has determined that a major effort must be undertaken to push NVA forces out of the area west and southwest of Ben Cat. The sense of urgency in clearing this area is heightened by the potential threat to the area just north of Saigon should the NVA deploy long range field guns to the southern terminus of the Saigon River infiltration corridor in southwest Binh Duong province. If the NVA strongly resists the planned ARVN operation, or brings in reinforcements, or initiates strong offensive action elsewhere as a diversion, resumption of heavy fighting could well result, despite the lack of intention by either side to undertake major military operations.

To sum up: NVA/VC forces in South Vietnam now have available to them a substantially larger inventory of heavy weapons than they did at the start of the 1972 Offensive last March. They have an estimated 500-700 armored vehicles available as compared with about 550 in March 1972. The enemy now has between 260 and 440 artillery pieces, including some with a maximum range of 27 kilometers, deployed in the GVN military regions I, II, and III. Last March the NVA had only about 330 artillery tubes available, and most of these were concentrated along the DMZ. The anti-aircraft capability of the NVA forces has been greatly augmented by the recent infiltration of about 150 large caliber weapons and by the large scale introduction of SA-7 surface-to-air missiles. In March 1972 NVA/VC forces relied for the most part on heavy machineguns to defend their units against VNAF and U.S. air strikes.

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BALTIMORE SUN  
26 March 1973

CPYRGHT

## The U.N.'s Panama Caper

"It would be most unfortunate if the Security Council were to be transformed into a small replica of the General Assembly, thereby impairing its capacity to deal effectively with specific issues affecting peace and security." This was Ambassador John Scali, speaking before he cast a United States veto against a Panama Canal resolution drafted by Panama for consideration by a Security Council sojourning in Panama under the chairmanship of a Panamanian.

By all the short, bright lights of propaganda, it was a nifty victory for General Omar Torrijos, the National Guard leader who has ruled Panama with a fine flair for Yankee-baiting. Through adroit diplomacy, Torrijos not only lured the Security Council to his country, but managed to isolate the United States on an issue that is just about the only issue in Panama. In a 13-to-1 vote on a resolution calling for a treaty that in effect would end United States control of the canal, only Britain gave Washington a measure of support by abstaining. Voting with Panama in addition to the usual array of Communist and Third World nations were such old reliables as France, Austria and Australia.

There is no doubt Panama has justified grievances against the United States that made such votes emotionally easy to cast. But it is doubtful that France would want a hostile road-show Security Council session on Djibouti. Or Austria would welcome a cards-stacked, on-site judgment on the Tyrol. Or Australia would lightly accept any Security Council interference in its bilateral prob-

lems over the islands of the Southwest Pacific.

We cite these examples not as literal probabilities but to underscore the implications of the Panama session. For they are serious indeed. Once the Security Council is turned into a mobile propaganda forum, once its global responsibilities are deflected into bilateral spats, once big-power faith in its peace-keeping functions evaporates completely—once all this happens the Security Council could, in fact, become "a small replica of the General Assembly."

We are in an era of world diplomacy that finds the big powers dealing rather ostentatiously with one another outside the United Nations. In terms of preventing major conflagration, this may not be an undesirable turn of affairs. Under current conditions, after all, peace is a matter that still rests with the Americans, the Russians, the Chinese, the Western Europeans and the Japanese. But if political and economic tensions rise dangerously between the southern and northern hemispheres, the world may find itself very much in need of an effective United Nations.

There is, alas, distressingly little evidence that Third World countries are shaping their policies to deal with such long-range prospects. Although the United Nations is pre-eminently their vehicle for shaping world diplomacy, they seem to have an irresistible penchant to behave in a manner destructive to the organization. Yes, Uncle Sam's beard has been yanked smartly in Panama City, but where do we go from here?